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Abstract: This paper discusses the notion of “Islamic 
Protestantism” as a vehicle to create a face of democratic 
and pluralistic Islam. Drawing from the works of some 
prominent Muslim reformists and Western scholars, it 
addresses in some parts the works of Indonesian scholars. 
The choice of democracy and pluralism as a main focus in 
this paper is based on the fact that these two issues, 
representing the basic ideological doctrines in the ever-
increasing globalized world, are not only fundamental 
doctrines of modern Western political philosophy but also 
now primary concerns of modern Islamic political thought. 
Inspired by the Christian Reformation, this piece tries to 
promote an idea of “Islamic Protestantism” by applying 
deconstruction and socio-historical approach as methods to 
understand Islamic discourses, texts, and history. 
Keywords: Islamic Protestantism, pluralism, deconstruc-
tion, Islamic reformism. 
Introduction 
In a time when the images of Islam as a religion of terrorism, 
extremism, despotism, authoritarianism, anti-pluralism, and mysogi-
nism are scattered throughout Western countries and elsewhere, 
discussion about Islam as a resource for peace, nonviolence, 
democracy, pluralism, feminism, freedom, and other universal human 
values remains a significant challenge. Abu-Nimer once says, “For the 
right, Islam represents barbarism; for the left, Islam looks like a 
medieval theocracy; and for the center, it seems like a kind of 
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distasteful exoticism.”1 In the eyes of (some) non-Muslims and 
Westerners today, the picture of Islam is identical with al-Qaeda, 
Hamas, Jama’ah Islamiyah, Ikhwanul Muslimin, the Mahdi Army 
which exert violence to achieve their goals.  
The attacks on the Pentagon and the WTC on September 11th, 
2001, have certainly brought about negative images of Islam. The 
tendency to view Islam as “a religion of the sword” colored by acts of 
terrorism and violence, however, is not a new phenomenon. Instead, 
such biased views and stereotypes have been deeply rooted in the 
propaganda of media and the works of early Orientalists since 
centuries ago. Islam has long been portrayed as being violent, 
aggressive, decadent, stagnant, irrational, mythical, despotic, 
undemocratic, and inhuman. On the contrary, Western civilization has 
been perceived as being peaceful, progressive, dynamic, rational, 
democratic, pluralist, and humane.  
Such negatives images and views of Islam have undergone a 
process of, to borrow the term Peter Berger2, “internalization” in the 
minds of today’s Westerners and non-Muslims. They then have 
subsequently formed cultures of hatred, enmity, prejudice, and unfair 
attitudes toward Islam and Muslim societies.3 Bernard Lewis, for 
instance, in many occasions said that Islamic tradition and liberal 
democracy are fundamentally incompatible. Further, for him, the 
Muslim world at the beginning of the twentieth century was faced with 
the dilemma between religious fanaticism and modernization.4   
                                                 
1 Mohammed Abu-Nimer, Nonviolence and Peacebuilding in Islam: Theory and Practice 
(Gainessville, FL: University Press of Florida, 2003), p. 2 
2 See Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luchman, The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise 
of Sociology of Knowledge (n.: Anchor, 1967); Peter L. Berger, The Sacred Canopy: Elements of 
Sociological Theory of Religions (n.: Anchor, 1990). 
3 Muhammed Abu-Nimer explains that there are some reasons why some Westerners 
view Islam and Muslim societies pejoratively. They include matters such as “selective 
reporting, lack of scholarly works on nonviolent and peaceful issues within Islam, the 
legacy of colonial subordination of Islamic countries to the West, ignorance of cultural 
differences, failure of Muslims to convey their messages, and the violent Arab-Israeli 
conflicts.” Mohammed Abu-Nimer, Nonviolence and Peace Building in Islam, p. 2.   
4 See Bernard Lewis, What Went Wrong? The Clash between Islam and Modernity in the Middle 
East (Publisher: Harper Perennial, 2003); Bernard Lewis, The Crisis of Islam: Holy War 
and Unholy Terror (Publisher: Random House, 2004). 
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This paper is to examine the views of Orientalists and non-
Muslims’ perceptions about Islam by assessing the strengths and 
weaknesses of Islam and its reliability in the light of contemporary 
world. In doing so, it investigates Muslim practices, violent- 
undemocratic or nonviolent-democratic, largely prevalent throughout 
the Muslim countries from Saudi Arabia to Indonesia. The notion of 
so-called “Islamic Protestantism” is quite significant to discuss in this 
paper. 
Two Faces of Islam 
Two reports on the state of political development in Muslim 
societies seem to confirm Lewis’s statement. First, the New York-
based Freedom House released a major study on the “Islamic World’s 
Democracy Deficit” on December 18th, 2001, just three month since 
the tragedy of the Pentagon and the WTC. The report documented an 
expanding gap between “Muslim countries” (i.e. countries in which its 
habitants are dominated by Muslims) and non-Muslim states in terms 
of levels of freedom and democracy. The report result is that a non-
Muslim country is three times more likely to be democratic than a 
Muslim one. Commenting the outcome of this research, Adrian 
Karatnychy, Freedom House president and coordinator of the 
research, says, “There is a growing chasm between the Islamic 
community and the rest of the world. While most Western and non-
Western countries are moving towards greater levels of freedom, the 
Islamic world is lagging behind.”5 Second is the research report of the 
United Nations Development Program (UNDP). Entitled Arab Human 
Development Report 2002: Creating Opportunities for Future Generations, the 
report concludes that the Arab world is at crossroads and that “the 
region is hampered by three key deficits that can be considered 
defining features: the freedom deficit, the women’s empowerment 
deficit, and the human capabilities or knowledge deficit.” Compared 
with the rest of the world, the Arab countries, the reports remarks, 
have “the lowest freedom score in the 1990s and when measured by 
indicators such as political process, civil liberties, political rights, and 
free media the Arab states had the lowest value of all regions of the 
world for voice and accountability.” Still, the report concludes that the 
                                                 
5 See Freedom in the World 2001-2002: the Democracy Gap (New York: Freedom House, 
2001). Available online at http://www.freedomhouse.org/reserach/survey2002.htm 
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Arab region “has been slower to democratize than other parts of the 
world and only 4 of 17 countries have multiparty electoral systems.”6    
Other data to support Lewis’ critiques can also be cited. They 
include: the military coup de’etat in Pakistan led by the General Parvez 
Musharraf; the growing extremist Muslim groups in Indonesia; the 
ongoing terror and violence in Sudan; and the conservative clerical 
backlash against Khatami’s reform movement in Iran. These cases 
seem to strengthen some analyses saying that the Muslim world cannot 
be separated from the world of terrorism, violence, despotism, and 
authoritarianism. Regrettably these analyses do not only judge Muslims 
but also Islam as a religion.          
Due to such cases, it is not easy to convince that Islam is a 
democratic, peaceful, nonviolent, and pluralist religion. Indeed there 
are some extremist Muslim groups from Saudi Arabia to Indonesia, 
from London to Jakarta, who use the means of violence to terrorize 
people and to reach their goals and interests.7 However, the acts they 
commit do not represent views and deeds of Islamic ummah (the 
Muslim society) as a whole. The reason is that in the Islamic world, as 
proved by some surveys,8  most Muslims reject the use of violence and 
terrorism as committed by Muslim extremists.  
Despite the fact that there are some fundamentalist Muslims who 
reject and do not recognize democracy, pluralism, and secularism, 
                                                 
6 UNDP, Freedom in the World 2001-2002: the Democracy Gap (New York: Freedom 
House) Available online at http://www.freedomhouse.org/reserach/survey2002.htm 
7 See Stephen Schwartz, The Two Faces of Islam: Saudi Fundamentalism and Its Role in 
Terrorism (New York: Anchor Books, 2003); Zachary Abuza, Millitant Islam in Southeast 
Asia: Crucible of Terror (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 2003); Khaled Abou El Fadl, 
The Great Theft: Wrestling Islam from the Extremists (New York, NY: Harper San 
Francisco, 2005). 
8 Take, for example, a poll taken in September 2006 by the Program on International 
Policy Attitudes. It found out that 94% of Iraqis had unfavorable view of al-Qaeda, 
with 82% expressing a very negative view. In six predominantly Muslim Arab 
countries, namely, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the United 
Arab Emirates, as shown by a poll in 2005 conducted by an expert in Arab public 
opinion Shibley Telhami, the influence of al-Qaeda was also very weak finding that 
only 7% of respondents supported al-Qaeda’s methods, and only 6% supported al-
Qaeda’s goal of creating a Muslim state in their home countries. See Christopher 
Preble, “War of the Worlds?,” Cato Policy Report, Vol. XXVIII No. 6, 
November/December 2006. In Indonesia, as the largest Muslim country, as shown by 
the surveys’ findings of the Indonesian Survey Institute, most Muslims also refuse 
violent ways of achieving goals. 
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many other Muslims worldwide are still willing to accept modernity, 
democracy, and “civic pluralism.”9 There is convincing evidence that 
many Muslims around the world support modernity and democracy. 
Recent political developments in Turkey, Iran, and Indonesia offer a 
more significant indication of Muslim concerns with democracy, 
freedom, secularism, and civic pluralism.10 Additionally, in the Arab 
and the Middle East, Muslim politics leading to the creation of 
peaceful democracy has developed significantly. A fascinating and 
significant study capturing this rising move within Muslim world, 
especially in Arab and the Middle East, in relation to the ideas of 
democracy, civil society, freedom, and secularism is clearly shown in 
the two volumes of Augustus Richard Norton-edited books.11  
Still, a recent study of Asef Bayat, academic director of the 
International Institute for the Study of Islam in the Modern World 
(ISIM) at Leiden University, entitled Making Islam Democratic, which 
focuses on post-Islamist Iran and H{izb al-Wasat } of Egypt, also shows 
promising hopes for the practice of democracy and pluralism in the 
Arab and the Middle East. In this study, Bayat argues that Islamic 
world, especially Arab and the Middle East and more specifically post-
Islamist Iran, is now in the process of democratization. Social 
movements and political struggles of student organizations, youth and 
women groups, intellectuals, academic circles, human right activists, 
and enlightened mullah, according to Bayat, have contributed to make 
Islam democratic and pluralistic. For him, since Muslim world is 
                                                 
9 The term “civic pluralism” refers to “a public culture and social organization 
premised on equal rights, tolerance-in-pluralism, and legally recognized differentiation 
of state and religious authority.” See Robert W. Hefner, “Muslim Democrats and 
Islamist Violence in Post-Soeharto Indonesia,” in Robert W Hefner (ed.), Remaking 
Muslim Politics: Pluralism, Contestation, and Democratization (Princeton and Oxford: 
Princeton University Press, 2005), p. 28. 
10 See Jenny White, Islamist Mobilization in Turkey: A Study of Vernacular Politics (Seattle 
and London: University of Washington Press, 2002); Abdolkarim Soroush, Reason, 
Freedom, and Democracy in Islam (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); Robert W. 
Hefner, “Muslim Democrats and Islamist Violence.” 
11 See Augustus Richard Norton, (ed.), Civil Society in the Middle East, Vol. 1 (Leiden & 
New York: E.J. Brill, 1995); Augustus Richard Norton, (ed.), Civil Society in the Middle 
East (Leiden & New York: E.J. Brill, 1996). 
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undergoing democracy, discussing the issues of compatibility or 
incompatibility between Islam and democracy is no longer relevant.12 
Bayat’s findings, actually, only confirm and reinforce previous 
works done by both Muslim and Western scholars. In 2002, Anthony 
Shadid wrote Legacy of the Prophet describing the new emerging Muslim 
politics in the Middle East. The main argument of this work is that a 
“sea change in political Islam”13 has taken place over the past twenty 
years. Mainstream Islamist groups are undergoing a maturisation 
process in terms of their political thought vis-à-vis society, the state, 
democracy, and nonviolence. Just like Bayat’s study, Shadid also 
featured the phenomenon of H{izb al-Wasat } in Egypt which welcomes 
non-Muslims (e.g. Coptic) and women within political structures, as 
well as is willing to work with non-Islamist party.14 The new pheno-
mena of “moderate fundamentalist” Muslims who are willing to 
engage with ideas of pluralism and democracy are also discussed by 
Ahmad Mousalli. In responding this trend, Mousalli states, “Moderate 
fundamentalist thinkers are not, of course, Western moderate 
democrats in the strict sense; however, they are indeed liberal and 
democratic enough in a context like the Middle East, which is plagued 
with nationalist totalitarian rules and traditional despotic kings.”15      
The above explanation illustrates that the Islamic world is like a 
forest consisting of many different trees and branches. Al-Qaeda and 
other similar Muslim extremist gangs are only one of these “Islamic 
trees.” Some Western scholars such as Samuel Huntington, Daniel 
                                                 
12 Asef Bayat, Making Islam Democratic: Social Movements and the Post-Islamist Turn 
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007). 
13 Anthony Shadid, Legacy of the Prophet: Despots, Democrats, and the New Politics of Islam 
(Boulder, CO: Westview, 2002), p. 76 
14 Essam Sultan, one of the founders of H {izb al-Wasat }, once stated, “The truth is that 
the most important, the clearest difference between the H {izb al-Wasat } and the Muslim 
Brotherhood (Ikhwa>n al-Muslimi>n) is faith in pluralism, faith in democracy, faith in 
freedom, faith in freedom of opinion, freedom of thought, freedom of activity, 
relations with other currents. The Muslim Brotherhood isolates itself from other 
political currents because they are outside the group’s religious framework. In relation 
to us, the H {izb al-Wasat}, we consider the other political currents part of the national 
framework. We must have to interact with them. It is not possible to bring about a 
renaissance for the future nation without joining forces with these other groups in 
society.” See at Anthony Shadid, Legacy of the Prophet: Despots, Democrats, and the New 
Politics of Islam, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2002), p. 262.  
15 See Norton, (ed.), Civil Society in the Middle East, p. 118 
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Pipes, Anthony Dennis, and Robert Spencer have wrongly read Islam 
as a “tree”, not a “forest”.16 Unfortunately, the “tree” they observe is 
merely an Islamic fundamentalism which is considered a menace for 
Western civilizations. They ignore the facts of democratic, pluralistic, 
peaceful, and nonviolent Islam scattered across Muslim world today17 
and in the past.18 On the contrary, they only desire to engage with 
aspects of violence and authoritarianism within some groups of 
Muslims.     
What I describe in the above paragraphs is just to show the fact of 
“two faces of Islam”, as with other religions, referring to the 
ambivalence. On the one hand, Islam performs quite democratic, 
peaceful, and plural; and on the other hand, it presents a violent and 
anti-democratic face. This is the phenomenon of what Scott Appleby 
calls “the ambivalence of the sacred” or that of “good Muslim and bad 
Muslim” to borrow the book title of Muslim Ugandan thinker 
Mahmood Mamdani.19 Islam is like a “virtual market” selling whatever 
human beings particularly Muslims need. Muslims can “purchase” 
whatever they want to. Through religious texts, historical backgrounds, 
and normative teachings, Islam “sells” universal worldviews and 
fundamental values such as inclusivism, pluralism, feminism, 
egalitarianism, freedom, democracy, humanism, and social justice. But 
                                                 
16 See Samuel P. Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72. No. 
3. (1993); Daniel Pipes, In the Path of God: Islam and Political Power (New York: Basic 
Books, 1982); Anthony Dennis, The Rise of the Islamic Empire and the Threat to the West 
(Bristol, IN.: Wyndham Hall Press, 1996); Robert Spencer, The Myth of Islamic Tolerance: 
How Islamic Law Treats Non-Muslims (Amherst, N.Y.: Prometheus Books, 2004). 
17 See L. Carl Brown, Religion and State: The Muslim Approach to Politics (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2000); Abdulaziz Sachedina, The Islamic Roots of Democratic 
Pluralism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); Mohammed Abu-Nimer, Nonviolence 
and Peacebuilding in Islam; Robert W. Hefner, Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in 
Indonesia (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2000); Robert W. Hefner, 
Remaking Muslim Politics; John L. Esposito and Azzam Tamimi (eds.), Islam and 
Secularism in the Middle East (New York: New York University Press, 2000). 
18 A fascinating account relating to the practice of peaceful and nonviolent living in 
medieval Islam can be found in Maria Rosa Menocal, The Ornament of the World: How 
Muslims, Jews, and Christians Created a Culture of Tolerance in Medieval Spain (New York: 
n.p., 2002). 
19 See Mahmood Mamdani, Good Muslim and Bad Muslim: America, the Cold War, and the 
Roots of Terror (New York: Pantheon Books, 2004); Scott Appleby, The Ambivalence of the 
Sacred: Religion, Violence, and Reconciliation (Lanham, MD: Roman and Littlefield 
Publishers, 2000).  
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at the same time, it also “sells” extremism, exlusivism, fanatism, 
hostility, injustice and so forth.  
Charles Kimball makes an interesting reason in his notion of 
“when religion becomes evil.” He argues that there are five warning 
signs of “when religion becomes evil.” First, when the adherents of 
religion claim their teachings, texts, and doctrines as the only one truth. 
This is what theologians call as the claim of truth. Second is that when 
the adherents have blind-loyalty toward their clerics or imam. Third is 
when they desire to build a religious kingdom. Fourth is when religion 
allows and legitimizes evil deeds. Fifth is when the followers of religion 
command a holy war.20 What Kimball argues is exactly what extremist 
Muslims have done.21 
In the case of Saudi, when the Wahha >bi >s were in power, terrorism 
and discrimination took place widely. As a result, undeniably, 
Wahha >bism can be seen as the main Islamic faction that hijacks Islamic 
teachings for supporting extremism and terrorisms. Furthermore, it 
has become the single greatest source of the impoverishment of 
contemporary Islamic thought.22  
Moreover, the ideological tenets of Wahha >bism and other Islamic 
wings of extremism like Salafism are strongly rooted in the Islamic 
texts and are heavily relied on Islamic traditions as their religious 
justification and “moral” legitimacy. Indeed, there are no religious texts 
that instruct directly the use of hostility, agitation, and violence. But, 
religious texts do inspire undemocratic policies and violent behaviors.23 
It is central, therefore, to review Islamic discourses and to carry out 
Islamic reform by promoting the so-called “Islamic Protestantism”.   
                                                 
20 Charles Kimball, When Religion Becomes Evil? Five Warning Signs (n.: HarperOne, 2003). 
21 Indeed, the temptation to use religion for political objectives is powerful and the 
consequences can be devastating. This is what Scott Appleby has said as a “weak 
religion.” Appleby said that religion becomes weak where religion as an independent 
cultural and social presence has been weakened, by neglect, oppression, a history of 
sub-ordination to a hostile or indifferent state, or by a losing struggle with forces of 
modernization. When religion becomes weak, it is easy to use it as a tool for violence. 
See Scott Appleby, The Ambivalence of the Sacred: Religion, Violence, and Reconciliation 
(Lanham, MD: Roman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2000).  
22 See Abdurrahman Wahid, “Right Islam vs. Wrong Islam”, The Wall Street Journal, 12 
December 2005; El Fadl, The Great Theft. 
23 See Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God.; Khalidi, Resurrecting Empire: Western 
Footprints and America’s Perilous Path in the Middle East.; Barton, Indonesia’s Struggle. 
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From Islamic Reformation to “Islamic Protestantism”  
The idea of “Islamic Protestantism” is deeply rooted in the history 
of Islam, especially since the nineteenth century, when some modernist 
Muslims and Arab nationalist leaders called for Islamic reformation. 
The reference of this idea is the fifteenth Christian Reformation led 
notably by Martin Luther. However both camps—modernists and 
nationalists—had different point of views regarding whether the 
Christian Reformation resembled Islam or the reverse: the 
developments in Christian history that resembled Islam. Thinkers like 
Muh}ammad `Abduh of Egypt (d. 1905), Muhammad Iqbal of India (d. 
1938), and Ziya Gokalp of Turkey (d. 1924), to name several Muslim 
modernists, tended to see the resemblance of the Christian 
Reformation to Islam. On the contrary, prominent nationalist figures 
like Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (d. 1897) and other reformists such as 
Indian reformer Sayyid Ahmad Khan (d. 1898), for instance, advocated 
the need for the spirit of the Christian Reformation and Luther to lead 
Islamic reformation. This call then was echoed by Fath ‘Ali 
Akhundzadah (d. 1878) in the Russian Empire and Abdullah Cevdet 
(d. 1932) of Ottoman Empire, both of whom used the Christian 
Reformation analogy as a cover for atheism.  
The call for the reformation goes further. Habib Allah Puri Riza 
(Iran) argued that Shi‘i Islam needed a “sacred revolution” “with 
thinkers like Luther and Calvin; Muh}ammad Rashi>d Rid }a> (d. 1935) 
cited the need to merge “religious renewal and earthly renewal, the 
same way Europe has done with religious reformation and 
modernization;” Hadi Atlasi (d. 1940) claimed the urgent need for a 
Muslim “Luther” to save the Muslim world, and he considered 
Shihabuddin Marjani (d. 1889), the founder of Islamic modernism in 
Russia, as the “Muslim Luther”24.  
In Indonesia, according to Deliar Noer in his The Modernist Muslim 
Movement in Indonesia, the call for Islamic reformation was advocated by 
Ahmad Dahlan, the founder of Muhammadiyah organization, Haji 
Miskin and Imam Bonjol in Minangkabau, the founders of Indonesian 
Wahhabism, and also Muhammad Natsir, “the opponent” of 
                                                 
24 See Michaelle Browers and Charles Kurzman (eds.), An Islamic Reformation? (Lanham: 
Lexington Books, 2004), pp. 1-17; Albert Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age 
1798-1939 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970); Charles Kurzman (ed.), Liberal 
Islam: A Source Book (New York 7 Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998). 
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Soekarno, the leading advocate of Indonesian secularism and 
nationalism, during the nationalist movement era.25 These Islamic 
reformation movements, according the secularist Syrian thinker Sadiq 
Jalal al-‘Azm, had caused the establishment of a counterreformation 
movements led by the Ikhwanul Muslimin in 1928 (?) and similar 
movements.26 In the Indonesian context, the modernist movements 
had stimulated the founding of the Islamic traditionalist organization, 
Nahdlatul Ulama in 1926, led by Syeikh Hasyim Asy’ari, the grandfather 
of Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur).    
Although in this piece I use the term “Islamic reformation,” it does 
not mean to imitate the above modernist ideas. To some degree, I 
strongly criticize such ideas as “reformation” or “modernization” for 
some reasons. First, their notions for calling a reformation, meaning 
“return to the Qur’a>n and the Sunna” (the precedent of the Prophet), 
remain problematic because, as I mentioned before, some verses of the 
Qur’a>n are not invulnerable from criticism. Still, since the precedent of 
the Prophet Muh}ammad is scattered and recorded in many classical 
Islamic resources—and at times the records contradict from one 
resource to another—the critical question is: which Sunna that is more 
authoritative? Second, their commitment to strictly follow the Qur’a>n 
and the Sunna, as well as the model of the Prophet’s companions (al-
salaf al-s}a>lih }) as the “authentic Islam” brings to the destruction of 
abundance of Islamic traditions, cultures, texts outside the Qur’a>n and 
the Sunna, and so forth which are regarded as “faces of Islam”—
accordingly need to be purified. Thus, “reformation” means 
“purification.” In responding to this group, Khaled Abou El Fadl 
states, “By emphasizing a presumed golden age in Islam, the adherents 
of Salafism (Abou El Fadl’s term for this group) idealized the time of 
the Prophet and his companions, and ignored or demonized the 
balance of Islamic history. By rejecting juristic precedents and 
undervaluing tradition, Salafism adopted a form of egalitarianism that 
deconstructed any notions of established authority within Islam”.27 
Third, their apologetic views are other weaknesses of this group. 
                                                 
25 See Deliar Noer, The Modernist Muslim Movement in Indonesia 1900-1942 (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1973). 
26 Browers and Kurzman (eds.), An Islamic Reformation?, p. 5.  
27 Khaled Abou El Fadl, “Islam and the Theology of Power”, Middle East Report, No. 
221, (2001), p. 32. 
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It is crucial to notify that these “reformist groups” are basically a 
cluster of apologist Muslims who defended the Islamic system of 
beliefs from the onslaught of orientalism, westernization, and 
modernity by simultaneously emphasizing the compatibility and 
supremacy of Islam. Their claims as the “modernists” fundamentally 
aim at creating a fantasy view of “Islamic modernity.” A large number 
of reformist groups responded to the intellectual challenges coming 
from the West by adopting pietistic fictions about the Islamic 
traditions. Such fictions avoided any critical evaluation of Islamic 
doctrines and traditions, and celebrated the imagined perfection of 
Islam. A common apologist argument was that any modern institutions 
and concepts including democracy, freedom, feminism, and pluralism 
were first and foremost invented by Muslims and had already existed 
within Islam.28 Based upon the above description Abou El Fadl, once 
states that the nineteenth and early-mid twentieth century reformist 
Muslim movements led by Abduh, Afgha>ni >, Rid }a>, Shawka>ni >, San`a>ni >, 
Qut}b, Hawa, Mawdu >di >, Dahlan,  and so forth, were a modified version 
of Wahha>bism, a puritan faction of Islam founded by Muh}ammad bin 
`Abd al-Wahha>b (d. 1792) in the late eighteenth century in Najd based 
on the creed of Ibnu Taymi >yah (d. 1328) and his disciple, Ibnu Qayyim 
al-Jauzi >yah (d. 1350). Abou El Fadl calls all of them the Salaf (“the 
predecessors”) simply because they had suggested Muslims to strictly 
go behind the Prophet, his companions, and their successors.29  
Do their claims work in favor of “Islamic Reformation”? The 
answer is frankly, “no.” It is because such “modernists” had projected 
ideals of “Islamic fantasy.” Their claims to return to the Qur’a>n and 
the Sunna by devaluing secondary texts of classical Islam, in practice, 
do not work. In addition, `Abduh’s claims (and other supporters) of 
“Islamic Protestantism” were far from the spirit of the Christian 
Reformation, which challenged the monopoly, supremacy, and 
                                                 
28 Beside the apologists, this cluster can be regarded the idealists, that is, those who 
advocate Islam is a religion that supports peace, nonviolence, pluralism, feminism, 
democracy and other universal principles. Islam is suitable for any area and time, 
wherever and whenever (al-Isla>m s }a >lih}un likulli zama >n wa maka >n). According to this 
group, Islam promotes pluralism and not sectarianism, advocates peace and not 
violence, teaches rah}mat (God’s blessing) and not disaster, love and not hatred and 
certainly harmony, living peacefully and nonviolently and not terrorism. 
29 El Fadl, The Great Theft, p. 75. 
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religious despotism of the Catholic Church. While Luther declared “95 
Theses,” demanded freedom from the monopoly of interpretation and 
the supremacy of Church, and deconstructed the problematic verses of 
Bible which are not suitable for the spirit of modern time, these 
Muslim groups, in contrast, had rejected any effort of self-criticism 
towards Islamic doctrines, discourses, and the original texts of the 
Qur’a>n. As a result, these groups have participated in creating the 
emergence of ideas and practices of religious fundamentalism, 
conservatism, authoritarianism, and despotism within Islamic world. 
This is among the fundamental reasons of the rise of the “second 
wave” of “Islamic Protestantism” movement in the late twentieth 
century and present day Islam. In 2002, an Iranian scholar Hashem 
Aghajari embarked on a “project of Islamic Protestantism” by arguing 
that like medieval Christianity, Islam in the Islamic Republic of Iran 
had changed to become bureaucratized and hierarchical, and 
accordingly it needs  fresh and radical ideas of reformation just like 
what had been done in the fifteenth Christianity. He described the 
“Islamic Protestantism” as a type of Islam characterized by rational, 
scientific, humanistic, thoughtful, intellectual, and open-minded.30  
Another eminent Muslim thinker joins in this camp is a Syrian 
author Muh }ammad Shahrour (b. 1938). Anthropologist Dale 
Eickelman in his article, “Islamic Liberalism Strikes Back,” states that a 
best-selling 1990 book by him, that is, Al-Kita>b wa al-Qur’a >n: Qira>’ah 
Mu‘a>s }irah (“The Book and the Qur’a>n: A Contemporary Reading”), 
“may one day be seen as a Muslim equivalent of the 95 Theses that 
Martin Luther nailed to the door of the Wittenberg Castle Church in 
1517”.31 Through this book, Shahrour provokingly argues the need for 
reinterpretation of the Qur’a>n with new lens and modern social 
sciences such as linguistics and hermeneutics to grasp the whole 
picture of the Qur’a>n, and not through the prism of centuries of 
jurisprudence. In his other book, Dira>sa>t al-Isla>mi >yah Mu‘a>s }irah fi > al-
Dawlah wa al-Mujtama` (“Contemporary Islamic Studies in State and 
Societies”), Shahrour also demands Muslims not to blindly follow the 
                                                 
30 Ayelet Savyon, “The Call for Islamic Protestantism: Dr. Hashem Agjhari’s Speech 
and Subsequent Death Sentence,” The Middle East Media Research Institute Special Dispatch 
Series, 445, December 2, 2002.   
31 Dale Eickelman, “Islamic Liberalism Strikes Back.” MESA Bulletin, No. 27, (1993), 
pp. 163-8. 
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conception and thoughts of medieval jurists Muslims. Well-known 
Iranian philosopher Abdolkarim Soroush (b. 1945) also is widely 
considered by both supporters and critics as the Martin Luther of 
Islam due to his strong critiques towards religious practices and 
thoughts of Iranian Mullah and Muslim fundamentalist in his home 
country. The revolution of 1979, he argued, was hijacked by the state’s 
own clerical establishment, who used their moral authority to gain 
absolute power, and by that reason, he claims that Iran is no longer a 
genuinely democratic religious government.32 No doubt, Soroush and 
Shahrour are among a few Muslims who have strong voices regarding 
the issues of freedom, democracy, pluralism, and other basic human 
right values.  
Besides the above Muslim scholars, Sudanese Muslim academician 
and activist Addullahi Ahmed Na’im (b. 1946) also has echoed the idea 
of Islamic reformation. However, he stated that an Islamic reformation 
cannot be a belated and poor copy of the European Christian model of 
Reformation. Instead, it will have to be an indigenous and authentically 
Islamic process. By his book, Toward an Islamic Reformation: Civil 
Liberties, Human Rights, and International Law, An-Na’im is an important 
voice for calling an Islamic reformation by reformulating the structure 
of “liberal Shari >‘ah” identified by granting civil liberties, respecting 
basic human rights, minority rights (particularly non-Muslims), equality 
before the law, and so forth. In an attempt to reconstruct this “new 
Sha‘ri >a”, he evokes the use of Mecca verses of the Qur’a>n, which is, 
according to him, more liberal, plural, and democratic.33 Moreover, 
Ahmad Bishara, the chairman of the National Democratic Movement 
of Kuwait, can be regarded as the supporter of this movement when 
he said that the aim of the political party he established was to “reform 
Islam the way Martin Luther reformed the Catholic Church.” Kenyan 
thinkers, Ali Mazuri and Alamin Mazrui, also pondered that “it would 
be particularly fitting if the Martin Luther of the Islamic Reformation 
                                                 
32 See Abdolkarim Soroush, Reason, Freedom, and Democracy in Islam; Reza Aslan, No god 
but God: the Origins, Evolution, and the Future of Islam (New York: Random House Trade 
Paperbacks, 2006). 
33 Abdullah Ahmed An-Na’im, Toward an Islamic Reformation: Civil Liberties, Human 
Rights, and International Law (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1996). 
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turned out to be a woman, posting her 95 Theses of reform not on the 
door of a Wittenberg mosque but universally on the Internet”.34  
A list of today’s Muslim reformers supported the idea of “Islamic 
Protestantism” can be lengthened. However, the point of this piece is 
just to show that such an idea does not come down from an empty 
sky. Rather, it is deeply rooted within the history of modern Islam 
which emerges as an outcome of the practices of religious despotism 
and discrimination of extremist and fundamentalist groups throughout 
the Muslim countries. Furthermore, the idea of this “Islamic Protes-
tantism” does not mean to do a “copy-paste” the fifteenth Christian 
Reformation” to current Muslim world or to conform the Protestant 
Reformation; rather, it is intended to take the “spirit” of the 
reformation in radicalizing Christian discourses and interpreting or de-
constructing religious texts, and then try to apply it within Islamic 
contexts. Thus, the term “Islamic Protestantism” is only a name 
referring to the “liberal ideas” of Islam. The term “Protestantism” here 
also can be referred to two things: Protestantism (with capital “P”) in 
the sense of the Protestant Luther or “protestantism” (within little 
“p”) in light of “protest” to the forms of Islamic despotism, 
conservatism, fanaticism, authoritarianism, fundamentalism, etc. 
Another notice is that this idea of “Islamic Protestantism” is not in the 
sense of social movements and political actions, but more to that of 
intellectual endeavors. 
In light of this framework, I am in line with the current Muslim 
reformers and I do support their intellectual endeavors in reforming 
and reconstructing Islam. However, at some point, I differ from them 
in terms of methodology of Islamic reformation. Generally, they use 
the discipline of hermeneutics (tafsi>r and ta’wi >l in the Islamic tradition) 
and enlarge the function of reason, mind, and thoughts (‘aql) to 
interpret, rationalize, and finally idealize the Islamic religion. They 
elaborate the means of ijtiha>d (critical reasoning) as an intellectual 
medium to find out and defend the idea of compatibility between the 
values of Islam and those of modern civilization and culture. Indeed, I 
realize that such interpretation is always the challenge for a religious 
community. Nevertheless, their ideas are not able to answer and solve 
“the problematic texts” in relation to discrimination, violence, 
injustice, unequal gender relationships, intolerance, and so on. 
                                                 
34 Browers and Kurzman (eds.), An Islamic Reformation?  
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Accordingly, the use of hermeneutical methodology is not sufficient. 
Muslims need breakthroughs beyond the texts.  
Their claims that the interpretation of the puritans is based on the 
lack of understanding of Islam and a very narrow perspective are 
incorrect and unfair. There are many puritans who have good 
knowledge in the Islamic tradition and in fact some of them are well-
educated. The supporters of puritanical ideology, such as Ibnu 
Taymi >yah, Ibnu al-Qayyim al-Jawzi >yah, Abu > al-A`la> al-Mawdu >di >, 
Sayyid Qut}b, Muh }ammad Qut}b, Sa`i >d H{awa, H{asan Tura >bi >, Shaykh 
Bin Ba>z, and al-Zawa >hiri > are brilliant Muslim scholars who grasp 
Islamic sources/traditions and have written numerous scholarly works 
on various topics. For instance, Sayyid Qut}b has written a number of 
books including Fi> Z {ila>l al-Qur’a >n which consists of thirty parts in six 
volumes, the book that has been used by worldwide puritanical groups 
as an intellectual basis of their movements. Ibnu Taymi>yah, Ibnu al-
Qayyim al-Jawzi >yah and al-Mawdu>di > are also known as intellectual 
Muslim “giants.” They had absolutely understood and were cognizant 
of what they had done in the interpretation of Islam based on the 
Qur’a>n, the H{adi >th and other Islamic traditions. The core problem 
here is not the lack of understanding and narrow interpretation but it is 
due to the Qur’a>n itself which provides ambivalent statements!       
Here I suggest that Muslims should be “idealistic” as well as 
“realistic.” I am aware that there are “two faces of Islam”: good-bad, 
light-dark, peace-violence, justice-injustice and so forth. I am cognizant 
that there are two sides within the history of the Prophet Muh}ammad: 
the bright history as well as the dark history.35 If Islam contains only 
positive sides as the idealists or apologists assume, the question is why 
does this religion breed the radical Muslim groups and individuals? On 
the contrary, if Islam just contains “negative teachings” as the 
“rejectionists” claim, why does this religion bears so many Muslims 
who devote their lives to peace building, democracy, pluralism, and 
human rights, and inter-faith dialogues?.36 If Islam has strongly 
                                                 
35 Ibnu Ishaq, H{aya >tu Muh}ammad [“The Life of Muhammad”], translated by A. 
Guillaume (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1955, 1987); Martin Lings, Muhammad: 
His Life Based on the Earliest Sources (Rochester, Vt.: Inner Traditions International, Ltd., 
1983).  
36 See at Chaiwat Satha Anand, (Qader Muheideen), The Nonviolent Crescent: Two Essays 
on Islam and Nonviolence (Alkmaar, The Netherlands: International Fellowship of 
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supported the ideas and movements against “the others” (Jews, 
Christians, non-Muslims, local beliefs, etc.) and provides only the 
teachings of anti-democracy, anti-pluralism, anti-egalitarianism, etc., 
like the puritans assume, why are there a lot of verses in the Qur’a>n 
and practices of Muh}ammad’s life that teach tolerance, freedom, 
democracy, equality, etc and command Muslims to live peacefully with 
others and to respect human beings.37 The existence of “the two faces 
of Islam” including the ambiguous texts of the Qur’a >n is due to the 
fact that the revelation process was dynamic in accordance with 
particular historical contexts and special backgrounds. The Qur’a>n 
itself “came down” within the particular context of circumstances 
(asba>b al-nuzu>l). So, it makes sense at all if the verses of the Qur’a>n 
provide different meanings from one another or simply said, they are 
“ambiguous” in meaning.   
Based on the above description, therefore, I will support the idea 
that Muslims should take only the positive side of Islamic tradition and 
texts and set aside the negative ones. Islam has to be placed only in its 
universal values and humanistic spirit. Examples of positive aspects of 
Islam are as follows: when Muh }ammad could conquer Mecca, a main 
town in Arabia at the time, that was known in the Islamic history as 
Fath}u Makkah (“the Victory or the Openness of Mecca”), Prophet 
Muh}ammad forbad his followers to destroy local tribes and other non-
Muslims and allowed them to practice their beliefs and faith based on 
some verses of the Qur’a>n that support and obligate all Muslims to live 
peacefully with believers. In addition, the Qur’a>n promises that “all 
those who believe—the Jews, the Sabeans, the Christians—anyone 
who believes in God and the Last Days, and whoever does good 
deeds, will have nothing to fear or regret” (Q.S. 5:69). The Qur’a>n also 
advises Muslims to coexist with the Jews and Christians: “We believe 
in God, and in that which has been revealed to us, which is that which 
was revealed to Abraham and Ismail and Jacob and the tribes of Israel, 
                                                                                                      
Reconciliation, 1996); Robert W. Hefner, Civil Islam; Robert W. Hefner, “Muslim 
Democrats and Islamist Violence”; Abdul Aziz Said, Nathan C. Funk, and Ayse S. 
Kadayifci (eds.), Peace and Conflict Resolution in Islam: Precept and Practice (Lanham, MD: 
University Press of America, 2001). 
37 See at Sachedina, The Islamic Roots of Democratic Pluralism.; Abu-Nimer, Nonviolence and 
Peacebuilding in Islam.; Reza Aslan, No god but God: the Origins, Evolution, and the Future of 
Islam (New York: Random House Trade Paperbacks, 2006). 
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as well as that which the Lord revealed to Moses and to Jesus and to all 
the other prophets. We make no distinction between any of them; we 
submit ourselves to God” (Q.S. 3:84).38 This is precisely what makes 
the idea of “monotheistic pluralism.”  
On the contrary, the verses of the Qur’a>n that contain teachings of 
intolerance, violence, anti-democracy, inequality, slavery, misogyny, 
and so on must be reexamined and deconstructed just like Luther had 
done with his “95 Theses.” Without deconstruction the equal 
relationships, the efforts of peace building, as well as egalitarian and 
humanistic theological transformation could have never been 
manifested in the religious community’s life. Deconstruction of “the 
problematic texts” is significant in order that the puritans/radicals do 
not use such texts to legitimize their acts. This approach is based on 
the fact that classical Islamic tradition also recognizes the concept of 
naskh (literally elimination or abrogation) in which the texts that are 
not suitable with the spirit of contemporary society can be ignored. 
Therefore, Muslims should elaborate on this concept to erase the 
problematic texts that are out-dated and are opposite to the spirit and 
worldviews of contemporary societies and contradict to the spirit of 
democracy, pluralism, heterogeneity, peace movements and other 
universal values. The approach is in-line with the Arabian sayings: 
“Khud} ma> s}afa> wa utruk ma> qadhara” (Take the clean things and leave the 
dirty ones).  
In this context, Muslims have to be able to distinguish the 
doctrinal aspects of Islam from its traditions or cultures, the teachings 
that provide resources for building human solidarity from those which 
are otherwise, those which reflect Arabian cultural influence from 
those which do not. Islam is rational so that any teachings which 
oppose human rationality should be avoided. Muh }ammad himself had 
said: al-di >n huwa al-‘aql la> di >na li man la > ‘aqla lahu (“Religion/Islam is the 
reason, there is no religion for those who have no reason). This means 
that a Muslim should use his or her rational power to analyze and to 
rethink all aspects of Islamic teachings. Islam is also contextual, in the 
sense that its universal values have to be translated into particular 
contexts—Arabian, Malay, Asian, American, Latino, African, 
Canadian, Russian and so on. Thus, any aspects of Islam which reflect 
                                                 
38 See Abdullah Yusuf Ali, The Qur’an: Text Translation and Commentary (Elmhurst, NY: 
Tahrike Tarsile Qur’an, Inc., 1987). 
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ancient Arab, even Quraysh, cultures, which are irrelevant to the 
modern context, are not binding on Muslims who live outside Arabian 
territory and, thus, there is no obligation for those people to conform 
to them.  
Examples of what non-Arab Muslims do not have to take into 
account because they are merely expression of a particular Islam in 
local Arabia, are the hija>b (female head covering), polygamy, the 
amputations of hands (for theft), retaliation (for death or injury), 
stoning to death (for adultery), obligatory beards and gowns of 
particular styles. Then, examples of Islamic teachings mentioned in the 
Qur’a>n that should be ignored by Muslims because they represent the 
opposite of universal humanistic principles, are the concept of dhimmi >, 
unequal gender relationships (e.g. male-female, heterosexual-
homosexual, etc.), mysoginism, slavery, the truth of claim and other 
teachings that have the potential to destabilize the world and threaten 
human relationships and human security. In my opinion, there is no 
“law of God”, as most Muslims understand that concept. What do 
exist are general principles and universal values which in the classical 
Islamic tradition of legal study are called maqa>s}id al-shari>‘ah, that is, the 
general goals of Islamic law. The values include the protection of 
religious freedom (h}ifz} al-di>n), reason (‘aql), property (ma>l), the family, 
and honor (nasl and ‘ird }). How these values are translated into any 
given historical and social context is something Muslims must work 
out for themselves through ijtiha>d (intellectual endeavor). I argue that 
Islam is “a living organism” that evolves concerning the pulse of 
humankind’s development Islam is not a static monument that was 
carved in the 7th century and thereafter as a beautiful statue may not be 
touched by the hand of history. Only through ijtiha>d or critical thinking 
can Islam be living wherever and whenever it is. Islam must be seen as, 
to borrow Mohammed Arkoun’s term, “a dynamic verb” instead of “a 
static noun.”39 
Once more, those teachings and texts have to be disclosed (read: 
deconstructed). The religious texts in Islamic tradition can be 
deconstructed through a socio-historical approach. This approach 
combines two methods: the historical and the sociological method. 
Norman Gottwald stated that the two methods are different but 
                                                 
39 Mohammed Arkoun, Islam: To Reform or To Subvert (London: Saqi Books, 2006). 
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complementary to each other.40 Historical method embraces all the 
methods of inquiry drawn from the humanities (e.g. literary criticism, 
form criticism, tradition history, rhetorical criticism, history of religion, 
etc). Sociological method includes all the methods of inquiry proper to 
the social sciences (e.g. anthropology, sociology, political science, 
economics, etc.). Both methods are significant to understand the 
dynamic of early Islam. Both methods are compatible for 
reconstructing early Islam and thought. Historical study of early Islam 
aims at grasping the sequential articulation of Muslims’ experiences 
including Muh}ammad as a “guider” and the rich variety of its cultural 
products. Sociological study of early Islam aims to hold the typical 
patterns of human relations (e.g. relations among tribes of Arabia) in 
their structure and function.41   
In a socio-historical approach, each community abandons some 
assumptions which have influenced the collective perception of the 
Muslim community. The premise is that the Qur’a>n as “God’s word” 
(I deliberately use quotation because I fundamentally do not believe in 
the “word of God”) is not to be seen as supra historic, or outside of 
history. A historical approach understands the “sacred texts” or 
scriptures as profane, temporal and impermanent because the Qur’a>n 
is an outcome of human cultures—a historical product. Thus, there is 
no reason to sacralize, dogmatize, and idolize it. Bibliolatry, borrowing 
T.H. Huxley’s term in Science and Hebrew Tradition, that is, “idolizing 
process toward scriptural texts,” is a dangerous view because it can 
bear fanatical attitudes and blind-behavior. The most dangerous enemy 
of Islam today is “bibliolatry” or dogmatism, a kind of closed 
conviction that a particular doctrine is an infallible medicine for all 
human problems and ignores the fact that human life is continually 
evolving. There is no sacred and holy text. The real one is a “sacralized 
text”. Instead, there is a long and complex historical process at work 
                                                 
40 Norman Gottwald, The Bible and Liberation: Political and Social Hermeneutics (Maryknoll, 
1984), p. 27. 
41 Excellent examples of socio-historical approaches to the religious texts particularly 
the Bible have been shown well by scholars of Graduate Theological Union, Berkeley. 
For instance, Norman Gottwald, The Hebrew Bible: A Socio-Literary Introduction 
(Philadelphia: 1985) and then Tribes of Yahweh: A Sociology of the Religion of Liberated Israel 
1250-1050 BCE; Robert B. Coote, In Defense of Revolution: The Elohist History 
(Minneapolis: 1991); Robert Coote and David Robert Ord, The Bible’s First History: 
From Eden to the Court of David with the Yahwist (Philadelphia: 1989).  
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through which texts become “scientia sacra” – both sacred and mythic. 
At the beginning, the Qur’a>n was an oral tradition. Codification and 
canonization of the Qur’a >n occurred in the time of the caliph 
`Uthma>n, far after the death of Muh}ammad. In the hermeneutical 
studies, there is a serious problem in the process of moving from oral 
tradition to a written one in religious traditions.42  
Conclusion 
Such deconstruction can serve to build a transformed religious 
community. But this “religious transformation” can only occur if each 
community is prepared to “detach itself” from the Text’s hegemony 
over the critical logic of the Muslim community. Instinctively, the text 
has been slithering beneath our consciousness, influencing every step 
of religious Muslim community behavior: do this, and don’t do that. 
We have acted like robots controlled by a remote control. As long as 
our movement is positive and “humanist” there is no problem with the 
Muslims’ approach to religion. The problem emerges when our actions 
are destructive and violent. Though the text has been considered 
sacred, containing positive “movement-principles” (for instance, the 
text regarding freedom/liberation, equality, the teaching of love, social 
solidarity, emancipation, universal brotherhood, etc.) it also contains 
negative “movement-principles” (such as slavery, doctrines of 
supremacy, gender domination, “jihad”, etc). Thus, the negative 
“movement-principles” of the text creates narrow-minded humans 
who exploit other humans in the name of religion and God. To 
deconstruct the Qur’a>n, first of all, Muslims should view the Qur’a>n as 
a “dynamic discourse” or in the Nas }r H{a>mid Abu > Zayd words in his 
Mafhu>m al-Nas}, “al-Qur’a>n ka al-khit }a>b,” and not as a “sacred text” (Al-
Qur’a >n ka al-nas}s}).43 In the 23-year revelation process, the Qur’a>n was 
also a dynamic phenomenon, full of dialogues, and following a take-
and-give mechanism, as well as receive-and-reject one. Indeed, as 
asserted by al-Zarkashi > in the al-Burha>n fi > ‘Ulu>m al-Qur’a>n, the Qur’a>n 
“came down” to Muh}ammad only in the shape of ideas while wording 
                                                 
42 William Graham has written an excellent book concerning this matter. See William 
Graham, Beyond the Written Word: Oral Aspects of Scripture in the History of Religion 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993). 
43 Nas }r H {a >mid Abu> Zayd, Mafhu>m al-Nass }: Dira>sa>t fi> ‘Ulu>m al-Qur’a>n (Cairo: al-Hay’ah 
al Mis}riyyah al ‘A <mmah li al-Kita >b, 1993). 
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was given by Muh}ammad himself44—the view that is totally different 
from mainstream Muslims who view and value the Qur’a>n both 
meaning and words as the “Word of God” (kala>m Allah). 
Likewise, it is important to deconstruct the idea that one text—and 
thus one religion—is superior to another. God is more magnificent 
than any text. He is beyond any text. The claim of supra-historical 
Godly verses reduces the greatness of the concept of God itself. So, 
through deconstruction, arthritic textual claims disappear—no one text 
or religion dominates another. These are the very latest efforts 
advocated by the inter-religious dialogue as explained by Leonard 
Swidler in his After the Absolute: the Dialogical Future of Religious Reflection 
(1991). The idea is to disavow “double standards,” the claims for 
unitary truths and single paths of salvation as these are all considered 
to be uncritical ways of thinking. Arthur J D’Adamo argues that this 
uncritical “way of knowing” is at the root of inter-religious community 
conflict. Each religious group thinks it has the source of truth -- (1) 
consistent and errorless; (2) complete and final, (3) the only source of 
salvation and enlightenment; and (4) directly given by God without 
human influence. It is a narrow minded way of thinking and not 
conducive for building a universal brotherhood. The religious 
dialogue’s activists should start discussing this “muh}arrama>t” 
(forbidden) topic without any hesitation or trepidation.  
We should open ourselves to other belief systems and restrict our 
egoism, abandon “primordial identity,” and use self introspection to 
look into the double standards we apply to others. As a Muslim, I have 
a duty to perfect and reform Islam in accordance with contemporary 
society and the modern era. Basically every Muslim functions as “a 
little Muh}ammad” who is responsible for reforming and perfecting 
Islam by taking only universal values of this religion for building 
pluralistic and democratic systems, civilized cultures and humanized 
civilization. Islam is a blessing for all human races as clearly asserted in 
the Qur’a >n: wa ma> arsalna>ka illa> rah }matan li al-‘a>lami >n. As humans are an 
organism that always develops—qualitatively or quantitatively, Islam 
itself must also be able to thrive in accordance with the needs of 
humanity. Only then, in widening our theologically inclusive view, 
would religions have significant positive roles for providing a spiritual 
                                                 
44 Muh }ammad bin `Abd Alla >h al-Zarkashi>, Al-Burha >n fi> al-Ulu>m al-Qur’a>n (Beirut: Da>rul 
Ma’rifah, 1972). 
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foundation for human futures in establishing cultures of pluralism and 
democracy. This has been superbly portrayed by Bhagavan Das, “all of 
us, the religion’s disciples, would meet in the same road of life. Who 
come from the far, who come from the near, all are hungry and thirsty, 
all are in the need of life’s bread and water which can be gained only 
through unity with the Supreme Spirit.” In short, “Islamic Pro-
testantism” is a foundation for creating democratic and pluralistic 
Islam. [] 
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